## 1

#### The narrative of progress structures us foreign policy; it reduces complex social issues to simple technical linear problem/solutions – aff harms aren't true, they can't solve, and it turns case

Escobar 1995 [Arturo, Kenan Distinguished Professor of Anthropology, UNC-Chapel Hill Director, Institute of Latin American Studies, UNC-Chapel Hill Adjunct Professor, Department of Geography, UNC-Chapel Hill Adjunct Professor, Department of Communications, UNC-Chapel Hill Fellow, Institute of Arts and Humanities, UNC Fellow, Center for Urban and Regional Research, UNC Facilitator, World Anthropologies Network / Red de Antropologías Mundiales Research Associate, Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, Bogotá, “Encountering Development THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD” 1995, page 52-53]

CONCLUSION The crucial threshold and transformation that took place in the early post– World War II period discussed in this chapter were the result not of a radical epistemological or political breakthrough but of the reorganization of a number of factors that allowed the Third World to display a new visibility and to irrupt into a new realm of language. This new space was carved out of the vast and dense surface of the Third World, placing it in a ﬁeld of power. Underdevelopment became the subject of political technologies that sought to erase it from the face of the Earth but that ended up, instead, multiplying it to inﬁnity. Development fostered a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational decision and management to be entrusted to that group of people—the development professionals—whose specialized knowledge allegedly qualiﬁed them for the task. Instead of seeing change as a process rooted in the interpretation of each society’s history and cultural tradition—as a number of intellectuals in various parts of the Third World had attempted to do in the 1920s and 1930s (Gandhi being the best known of them)—these professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies ﬁt a preexisting model that embodied the structures and functions of modernity. Like sorcerers’ apprentices, the development professionals awakened once again the dream of reason that, in their hands, as in earlier instances, produced a troubling reality. At times, development grew to be so important for Third World countries that it became acceptable for their rulers to subject their populations to an inﬁnite variety of interventions, to more encompassing forms of power and systems of control; so important that First and Third World elites accepted the price of massive impoverishment, of selling Third World resources to the most convenient bidder, of degrading their physical and human ecologies, of killing and torturing, of condemning their indigenous populations to near extinction; so important that many in the Third World began to think of themselves as inferior, underdeveloped, and ignorant and to doubt the value of their own culture, deciding instead to pledge allegiance to the banners of reason and progress; so important, ﬁnally, that the achievement of development clouded the awareness of the impossibility of fulﬁlling the promises that development seemed to be making. After four decades of this discourse, most forms of understanding and representing the Third World are still dictated by the same basic tenets. The forms of power that have appeared act not so much by repression but by normalization; not by ignorance but by controlled knowledge; not by humanitarian concern but by the bureaucratization of social action. As the conditions that gave rise to development became more pressing, it could only increase its hold, reﬁne its methods, and extend its reach even further. That the materiality of these conditions is not conjured up by an “objective” body of knowledge but is charted out by the rational discourses of economists, politicians, and development experts of all types should already be clear. What has been achieved is a speciﬁc conﬁguration of factors and forces in which the new language of development ﬁnds support. As a discourse, development is thus a very real historical formation, albeit articulated around an artiﬁcial construct (underdevelopment) and upon a certain materiality (the conditions baptized as underdevelopment), which must be conceptualized in different ways if the power of the development discourse is to be challenged or displaced. To be sure, there is a situation of economic exploitation that must be recognized and dealt with. Power is too cynical at the level of exploitation and should be resisted on its own terms. There is also a certain materiality of life conditions that is extremely preoccupying and that requires great effort and attention. But those seeking to understand the Third World through development have long lost sight of this materiality by building upon it a reality that like a castle in the air has haunted us for decades. Understanding the history of the investment of the Third World by Western forms of knowledge and power is a way to shift the ground somewhat so that we can start to look at that materiality with different eyes and in different categories. The coherence of effects that the development discourse achieved is the key to its success as a hegemonic form of representation: the construction of the poor and underdeveloped as universal, preconstituted subjects, based on the privilege of the representers; the exercise of power over the Third World made possible by this discursive homogenization (which entails the erasure of the complexity and diversity of Third World peoples, so that a squatter in Mexico City, a Nepalese peasant, and a Tuareg nomad become equivalent to each other as poor and underdeveloped); and the colonization and domination of the natural and human ecologies and economies of the Third World.26 Development assumes a teleology to the extent that it proposes that the “natives” will sooner or later be reformed; at the same time, however, it reproduces endlessly the separation between reformers and those to be reformed by keeping alive the premise of the Third World as different and inferior, as having a limited humanity in relation to the accomplished European. Development relies on this perpetual recognition and disavowal of difference, a feature identiﬁed by Bhabha (1990) as inherent to discrimination. The signiﬁers of “poverty”, “illiteracy,” “hunger,” and so forth have already achieved a ﬁxity as signiﬁeds of “underdevelopment” which seems impossible to sunder. Perhaps no other factor has contributed to cementing the association of “poverty” with “underdevelopment” as the discourse of economists. To them I dedicate the coming chapter.

#### Specifically, the aff invokes the narrative of progress:

#### -----------

#### Our impact is the biggest – the narrative of progress locks us into ignoring pressing economic, environmental, nuclear, and social issues that risk extinction because we believe our exceptionalism

Loewen 07(James W. "Jim" Loewen, American sociologist, historian, and author, University of Vermont, “Lies My Teacher Told Me”, page 285 – 286, 2007, RLA)

This is the America in which most textbook authors grew up and the America they still try to sell to students today. Perhaps textbooks do not question the notion that bigger is better because the idea of progress conforms with the way Americans like to think about education: arneliorative, leading step by step to opportunity for individuals and progress for the whole society. The ideology of progress also provides hope for the future. Certainly most Americans want to believe that their society has been, on balance, a boon and not a curse to mankind and to the planet. History textbooks go even further to imply that simply participating in society. Americans contribute to a notion that is constantly progressing and remains the hope of the world. As Boorstein and Kelley put it, near the end of A History of the United States, “ Americans – makers of something out of nothing – have delivered a new way of life to the far corners of the world.” Thus, the idea of American exceptionalism – the United States as the best country in the world – which starts in our textbooks with the Pilgrims, gets projected into the future. Faith in progress has played various functions in society and in American history textbooks. The faith has promoted the status quo in the most literal sense, for it proclaims that to progress we must simply do more of the same. This belief has been particularly useful to the upper class, because Americans would be persuaded to ignore the injustice of the social class if they thought the economic pie kept getting better for all. The idea of progress also fits in with social Darwinism, which implies that lower class lower owing to its own fault. Progress as an ideology has been intrinsically antirevolutionary: because things are getting better all the time, everyone should believe in the system. Portraying America so optimistically also helps textbooks with stand attacks by unpatriotic critics in Texas and other textbook adaptation states. Internationally, referring to have not countries as “developing nations” has helped the “developed nations” avoid facing the injustice of worldwide stratification. In reality “development” has been making Third World Nations poorer, compared to the First World. Per capita income in the First World was five times that in the Third Word in 1850, ten times in 1960, and fourteen times by 1970. It’s tricky to measure these ratios, partly because a dollar buys more in the Third World than in the First, but per capita income in the First world is now twenty to sixty times that in the Third World, The vocabulary of progress remains relentlessly hopeful, however, with regard to the “undeveloped.” As economist E.J. Mishan put it, “Complacency is suffused over the globe, by referring to these destitute and sometimes desperate countries by the fatuous no – menclature of ‘develiping nations.’ In the nineteenth century, progress provided an equally splendid rational for imperialism. Europeans and Americans saw themselves as performing government services for utilizing natural resources of natives in distant lands who were to backward to do it themselves. ¶ Almost every day brings new reasons for ecological concerns, from deforestation to the equator to ozone holes at the poles. Cancer rates climb and we don’t know why. We have no way to measure the full extend of human impact on earth . The average sperm count in healthy human males around the world has dropped nearly 50 percent over the past fifty years. If environmentally caused, this is no laughing matter, for sperm have only to decline in a straight line for another fifty years and we will have wiped out human kind without knowing how we did it. We Were similarly unaware for years that killing mosquitoes with DDT was wiping out birds of prey around the globe. Our increasing power makes it increasingly possible that humankind will make the earth uninhabitable by accident. Indeed, we almost have on several occasions. In the early 1990s, for example nations around the planet agreed to stop production of CFGs that damaged the ozone in the upper atmosphere. In 2006 Washington Post writer Joel Achenbach noted, “Scientists are haunted by realization that if CFCs had been made with a slightly different type of chemistry they’d have destroyed much of the ozone layer over the entire planet. We were simply lucky. All these considerations imply that more of the same economic development and nation state governance that brought us this far may not guide us to a livable planet in the long run. We do not simply face an energy crisis that might be solved if we only develop low – cost energy that does not pollute or cause global warming. On the contrary, if we had cheaper energy, imagine the havoc we might cause! Scientists have already envisioned how we could happily use it to decrease salinity of the seas, increase our arable Land, and in other ways make our planet nicer for us – in the short run. Instead, we must start treating the earth as if we plan to stay here. At some point in the future, perhaps before readers of today’s high school textbooks pass their fifteenth birthdays. Industrialized nations, including the United States may move towards steady state economies in their consumption of energy and raw materials. Thus, our oil crisis can best be viewed as a wake up call to change our ways. Second our use of oil (and all other fossil fuels) has a serious worldwide impact: global warming, As everyone knows, except some high school history textbook authors, this warming melts the polar ice caps, causing sea levels to rise. Oceans rose one foot in the last century. The most conservative estimates, embraced by the George W Bush Administration, predicts they will rise another three feet in this century. Around the world --- from Mexico to Venace to much of Bangladesh – hundreds of millions of people live close enough to sea level that this rise will endager their lives and occupations. The resulting dislocation will constitute the biggest crisis mankind has faced since the beginning a recorded history. And this is the most pleasant estimate. If the Greenland Ice Sheet Ricses the ocean may rise twenty three feet. Scientists James Lovelock in 1970 famously invented the “Gaia Hypothesus,” the idea that the earth acts as a homeostatic system. Recently Lovelock has pointed out that as Earth’s equilibrium gets disturbed, some disequilibrium processes may cause even faster warming. As the polar ice cap melts, for example , they no longer reflect the son’s rays, so the earth absorbs more heat. Lovelock predicts the death of billions of people before the equilibrium is established once more. Global warming also increases other weather problems: the average windspeeds of hurricanes have doubled in the past thirty years, and they are also more frequent. That’s not all. Evidence shows that carbon dioxide, a normal result of burning oil or coal, also makes oceans more acidic. Scientists warn that, by the end of the century, this acididty could decimate coral reefs and kill of creates that undergurd the sea’s food chain. “It’s the single most profound environmental change I’ve ever learned about in my entire career,” said Thomas Lovejoy, author of Climate Change and Biodivdersity. What we’re doing in the next decade will affect our oceans for millions of years,” said Ken Caldeira, oceanographer at Stanford University. In addition to our energy and global warming crises we face other severe problems. Thousands of species face imminent extinction. One list of likely canidadates includes a third of all amphibians, a fourth of the world’s mammals, and an eight of its birds. Wilson thinks the foregoing is optimistic and believes two thirds of all species will perish before the end of the century. Nuclear proliferation poses another threat. In 1945 only one country – the United States had the know how and economic means to build nuclear weapons. Since then, Great Britian, the USSR, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, and apparently North Korea have joined the nuclear club. If Pakistan and North Korea can do it, clearly almost every nation on earth – and some private organizations, including terrorist groups has the capacity. The United States cam uncomfortably close to using nuclear weapons in Vietnam in 1969, and India and Pakistan came uncomfortably close to using them against each other in 2002. In the long run just keeping to the old paths regarding all these new problems is unlikely to work. “From the mere fact that humanity has survived to the present, no hope for the future can be salvaged,” Mushan noted. “The human race can only perish once.¶

#### Vote neg – refusing the narrative of progress is necessary to allow Latin American movements to rise up to check dominant narratives of exceptionalism

Rosenberg ‘6**,** (Associate Professor of Hispanic Studies and Comparative Literature at Brandeis (Fernando J., The Avant-garde and Geopolitics in Latin America, Google Books, p. 1-6, njw)

THIS BOOK is about the avant-gardes of Latin America and their critique of modernity.1 Rather than engaging in the construction of an alternative modernity or attempting to renegotiate the modern in relation to the traditional, these vanguardists, I contend, sought to produce a critique of the modern as a global project.¶ From the perspective of a narrative of progress, Latin America seems to be cast either as a relic from the primitive past or as an unrealized but promising future. The linear temporality of the Judeo-Christian tradition— "ascending, descending, progressive or regressive," as Gianni Vattimo (1992, 87) characterizes it—and its modern varieties—evolution, decadence, revolution, and novelty—were as deeply embedded in the Latin American discourses of emancipation as they were in every project of modernity. But the difference that the avant-gardes opened to inquiry, a difference that cannot be reduced to the contours of "cultural difference" in the traditional anthropological sense, is that at both ends of the foundational narrative—the promise of the future and redemption through and of the past—Latin American discourse reencountered itself as subject to a larger order. It is as if the various futurisms and primitivisms that European movements displayed in an attempt to articulate a reaction against a bourgeois, conservative order (to express it in blatantly vanguardistic terms) were untenable from the Latin American position. For the Latin American avant-gardes, these alternatives kept referring back to the subaltern situation of Latin Americans themselves vis-a-vis the idea of the West, a concept that neither clearly included nor excluded Latin America.-¶ From this position, Latin American avant-gardes could undertake a critique of modernity and its narratives, including those of "international"1 modernism and its avant-gardes, but along a different axis, not through rushing the temporalities of progress forward or through a return to primitive origins. Instead, they developed narratives of space that articulated the Latin American situation in a shifting world order. Some European avant-gardes movements (cubism, dadaism, surrealism, etc.) attempted to undermine the legacy of the Enlightenment and its foundation in the white man as the model of rationality and historical agency under the direction of universal, abstract progress. Because of their investment in modernity and their peripheral position in its foundational narratives, however, Latin Americans were forced to level their criticism through and with a particular attentive-ness to spatial issues that addressed this problematic inclusion but that were repressed by the same idea of progress that they embraced.¶ This is not to say that Latin American avant-gardes were at any point more "advanced" than their European counterparts. While they tried to unravel European cultural supremacy, European avant-gardes usually remained attached to an assumption of their own universality. Artistic flights overseas were one way in which this was expressed, as the search for non-Western ways of life and perception became an exploration into the repressed soul of the universal human. For Latin American avant-gardists, (many times, no doubt, inspired by the Europeans), that position was untenable because the process of "discovery" was carried out under the suspicion of reproducing colonial dynamics. Therefore, tracking down influences and assessing the degree to which Latin American movements followed or did not follow European movements, as has been done repeatedly, misses the point and reproduces a colonial logic of unilinear development that, as we will see, Latin American avant-gardes tried to destabilize.¶ Vicky Unruh rightly argues in her seminal book Latin American Vanguards (1994) that these movements overcame an idea of national and/or continental identity as rooted in an original nature and landscape.4 What Peter Burger in his Theory of the Avant-Garde (1984) called the nonorganic character of the work of art, that is, the possibility of assembling different components with no final resolution of the internal tensions, is akin to this moment in which identity was conceived as a collage (Unruh, chapter 3). The connection Unruh makes between the collagelike constitution of the work of art and issues of national and continental identity is compelling, since ideas of hybridism, transculturation, and cultural anthropophagy or cannibalization—conceptual tools that the avant-gardes favored—traversed the twentieth-century Latin American discussion. But to what degree did the vanguards represent only another step in the constitution of national or regional identities? No doubt, the different movements and writers are inevitably embedded in national traditions. But some texts of the vanguards, I propose, suggest that the question of identity is intertwined with a redefinition of the location of discourses about it in the context of a global negotiation. In these texts, the problem of loci of enunciation—that is, the conditions of possibility for Latin American artists and writers to intervene in the larger debate about modernity—takes precedence and redefines the problem of identity.¶ As part of a geopolitical shift that, with the advent of World War I, shook loose the assumptions of nineteenth-century liberal culture, the avant-gardists in Latin America explored the limits of a national, culturalist response to crisis of the universality of civilization. The concern of the national Creole elite in the constitution of its hegemony—namely, how to organize the nation (or Latin America, for that matter) so as to inscribe its culture more firmly in the annals of universal history—was for the first time left in suspense, owing to the war that put an end to the nineteenth century's faith in the rationality of European history and the worldwide projection.¶ Since literary criticism in Latin America was by and large engaged in the travails of the national cultural elite, I intend to open up the vanguard texts to this different set of concerns, shedding light by the same token on the makeup of that critical tradition. I am interested in the moments of interruption when vanguard experiments called attention to contemporary places of identification and symbolic production that were neither national cultures nor reducible to them. Such interruptions occurred as literary discourses exhibited an openness to planetary concerns that resulted in an exploration of vanguardistic ambition. As a result, the vanguards were led to recognize the indebtedness of literary discourses to the reproduction of colonial perspectives and to occupy positions of utterance that they imagined to dislodge this coloniality.¶ "From 1922 (the date is tentative, it is a situation of consciousness that has been defining itself little by little) all that has ended," writes Jorge Luis Borges (1926,15), the vanguardist, in reference to the sea change that set in motion a Latin American artistic and intellectual field that would no longer voice "our longing for Europe."5 Without attempting to reduce cultural production to a set of contextual conditions, I want to point out certain major historical trends that framed this alternative imaginary. The 1920s and 1930s were decades when the political order was reconfigured as the consequence of an ongoing change in the global geopolitical balance following World War I. It was a time of increasing democratization in the Latin American social space, but it was also an era of new pacts between conservative forces in different national arenas. The upheavals and revolutions that provoked regime changes in more than one national context at the end of the 1920s differed in character, yet they shared a common soil, as historian Tulio Halperin Donghi (1996, 371) makes clear:¶ The world crises that erupted in 1929 had an immediate and devastating impact in Latin America, the loudest sign of which was the collapse, between 1930 and 1933, of the majority of the political situations that had consolidated during the good times that came before. What was not immediately evident was that the crash differed from previous complications along the way not only in terms of its unprecedented intensity; this crisis ushered in a new era in which the painful solutions that had allowed the continent to incorporate itself into an increasingly global economy proved ineffectual. 6¶ We are not referring to a discrete event but to a broad historical pattern that subtly undermined faith in the viability of national autonomy as a way to frame, understand, and localize the production of culture. The question of what might constitute Latin Americas possibilities, its conditions of cultural production in this "increasingly global economy," was at stake in many avant-garde texts of the early 1920s.¶ A parallel demographic change touched on the imaginary of positive modernity and its inception in foundational national narratives. The rural-urban balance of power on which modernity as spatial conquest was carried out (that is, the city as a model of govern mentality whose effects were to be projected onto the rest of the territory) was unsettled with the formation of what the historian Jose Luis Romero (1986, chapter 7) called the "massified city." Major demographic changes were already occurring in many Latin American cities and had produced an overall change in the cultural landscape at the end of the nineteenth century. But the vanguard movements were the first artistic enterprises of the cultural elite that didn't react to this shift with strategies of domination, separation, or rejection. Instead, in an effort to cross the "great divide" between mass culture and elite culture, they integrated with and accommodated themselves to the logic of mass production and consumption.' The well-studied phenomena of unabashed promotion of artistic movements, the circulation of ideas through magazines, the interest in new media, and the political engagement with increasingly visible nonelite subjects can all be traced back to the vanguards' attempts to break through the narrowly conceived boundaries of literary culture.¶ This change of cultural practices entailed a broader concern with what I will call positionality. At a time when the hierarchies embedded in a notion of a progress that promised to spread from center to periphery and from city to countryside were being questioned, some cultural actors found themselves needing to gauge new configurations of production, circulation, and consumption within an expanded horizon, a world-system of attribution of cultural value and meaning. Countering modernity as a merely expansionist force, to the unilinearity of universal history, Latin American artistic movements would continue to posit places of resistance to anchor their identities in the midst of historical flows. Consequently, the elemental refuge of the baroque rain forest that magically eschews Western categories or the boundary-less hinterlands that haunt the gaze of the observer, though refractory of positivist discourse, would continue to be revamped (by early travelers of the nineteenth century, regional writers of the early twentieth century, and practitioners of magic realism) as a cornerstone of cultural formation. But the avant-gardes opened the possibility of a different strategy. Amid so much praise and condemnation of speed and transportation as icons of the universalized, homogeneously modern abolition of spatial constraints, the vanguards elaborated, for the first time, their own loci of enunciation imbricated in the circulation of goods, discourses, and peoples. Two seminal manifestos of the early 1920s—one Argentinean, the other Brazilian—are exemplary in that regard:¶ A single struggle—the struggle for the way. Lets divide it up: poetry for import. And Brazilwood poetry for export. (Schwartz 1991, 138)¶ Martin Fierro accepts the consequences and responsibilities of situating oneself. . . . Instructed on his antecedents, his anatomy, the meridian on which he walks, he consults the barometer, the calendar, before stepping into the street in order to live it with the nerves and mentality of nowadays... .8 To accentuate and to expand to the rest of the intellectual activities, the independent movement in language initiated by [poet] Ruben Dario doesn't mean .. . that we will renounce, much less pretend not to recognize, that every morning we use Swiss tooth paste, French towels, and English soap (Schwartz 1991, H3-I4)-9¶ Two native, national products, one commercial ("Brazilwood," the first Brazilian export to the metropolis and the source of the regions name) and one cultural (Martin Fierro, the mythic character in the epic poem about an autochthonous gaucho as a founder of Argentinean nationality) are not only the anchor for a renewed nationalism, as has been argued widely, but also become vantage points from which to understand an expanded geopolitics. The map projected to elaborate this position needs to be altogether different from the one inherited from the period of nation-state formation. The modern and the new, so the "Manifesto Martin Fierro" seems to claim, necessarily come from an elsewhere that also has the power to define modernity and its others, whereas the "Brazilwood manifesto" foregrounds the fact that what stands as artistically new also depends on a sort of validation that is not at all foreign to a global circulation of commodities.

## 2

#### TEXT

THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENTER INTO BINDING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA OVER AN OFFER THAT \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### CHINA WILL SAY YES

#### GENUINE CONSULTATION ON REGIONAL HOTSPOTS NECESSARY TO BUILD A FRAMEWORK OF TRUST NECESSARY TO SAVE US-SINO RELATIONS, IMPACT IS WORLD PEACE

Vice Foreign Minister Zhang 12

[Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun at the Eighth Lanting Forum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Stay committed to peaceful development and win-win cooperation the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China: 28 December 2012 Westlaw]

China and the United States, one the world's largest developing country and the other the biggest developed one, are also the two largest economies in the world. That makes their relationship one of the most important yet complex in the world. Whether the two countries will live amicably with each other is an issue whose significance goes far beyond the bilateral scope and which concerns peace, stability and prosperity of the whole world. Some regard it a law of history that there have always been fierce clashes, at times, conflicts and wars, between an established power and an emerging power. But we reject such fatalism. In our view, in this globalized era when countries are inter-dependent with their interests closely linked, there has been a major shift in international relations. In the face of frequent global challenges, all countries would want to stick together to meet challenges together and pursue common development. This is an unstoppable historic trend. Those who go along with it will prosper and those against it perish. We are sober-minded on this and it is from this perspective that we view and approach China-US relations. We are committed to seeking new answers to old problems and are determined to foster a new major-country relationship based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation.

What has happened in China-US relations shows that both sides stand to gain from cooperation and lose from confrontation. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the issuance of the Shanghai Communique and the resumption of contact between the two countries. China-US relations have entered a stage where they should no longer have doubts about further growth of this relationship. Over the past 40 years, great progress has been made in China-US relations. In particular, the two presidents have reached important agreement to build a new type of major-country relationship based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation, heralding a new, historic starting point for China-US relations. Two-way trade has surged from nearly zero at the time of resumption of contact to 446.6 billion US dollars last year and is expected to exceed 500 billion US dollars this year. The two sides, once in estrangement and confrontation, now engage in dialogue and cooperation. We have had the Strategic and Economic Dialogues (SandED), the High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange and a total of more than 90 consultation mechanisms covering political, economic, trade, security, defense, scientific, technological, people-to-people, cultural, energy, the environment and many other fields. This is not commonly seen in major-country relations and speaks volumes about the dynamism and potential of China-US relations. More than 3.5 million visits are taking place between the two countries every year, nearly 10,000 every day on average. The two countries have maintained close communication and coordination on counter-terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change and regional hotspot issues.

That being said, China and the United States still differ significantly in social system, development stage, history, culture and tradition and still face major and sensitive issues including Taiwan and Tibet-related issues. These issues, if not handled properly, will upset or even seriously damage the bilateral relationship.

To dispel strategic mistrust and build a new type of major-country relationship is a demanding task which calls for unflinching efforts from both sides. At the current stage, I believe it is important for the two countries to do the following:

First, they need to have candid and in-depth communication so as to avoid strategic misjudgment. China and the United States have maintained close high-level contacts and exchanges through quite a number of mechanisms of dialogue and communication including the SandED, the Strategic Security Dialogue and the Consultation on Asia-Pacific Affairs. Given the profoundly changing and complex international and regional landscape and the growing destabilizing factors and uncertainties, to have in-depth, candid discussions to find solutions and to strengthen coordination and cooperation will help reduce mutual suspicion and boost strategic mutual trust. Apart from increasing dialogue, coordination and cooperation on global issues and international and regional hotspot issues, it is also important that the two sides truly follow the principle of mutual respect, understand each other's national condition and public opinion, respect each other's choice of social system and development path, and refrain from imposing one's own will on the other side.

#### THESE REGIONAL HOTSPOTS INCLUDE LATIN AMERICA

Beijing Xinhua 09

[Xinhua: 1st Round Sino-US Strategic, Economic Dialogue Concludes in Washington World News Connection July 29, 2009 Westlaw]

IV. On Sino-US Cooperation on International and Regional Issues The two sides discussed the common international challenges facing the two countries. They were resolved to maintain close communication and coordination and work together with the rest of the international community for the settlement of conflicts and reduction of tension that trigger regional and global instability. The two sides noted that traditional and nontraditional security threats are intertwined, and situations in Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and African require combined efforts. The two sides reaffirmed the importance of the Six-Party Talks, the continuing efforts to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the maintaining of peace and stability of the Peninsula and Northeast Asia. They emphasized the importance of implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1874 and resolving the nuclear issue on the Peninsula through peaceful means. The two sides agreed to exert greater efforts for the early realization of the aforementioned goals. The two countries also pledged to increase coordination to jointly promote stability and development in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They agreed that senior officials from both countries with responsibilities for Iran and the Middle East should continue to consult closely on these issues. The two sides expressed their willingness to increase coordination and consultation on the issue of Sudan to jointly seek an early and enduring political settlement of the Darfur issue and promote the peace process between the north and the south of Sudan.

BOTh sides pointed out their shared opposition to terrorism and pledged to work collaboratively to strengthen global non-proliferation and arms control regimes. They reiterated their respective nuclear policies and discussed the upcoming 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] Review Conference and the Conference on Disarmament. The two sides also exchanged views on the Global Nuclear Security Summit proposed by the US side and reiterated the importance of existing dialogues on security, arms control, non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism issues. The two sides intend to further enhance dialogue and cooperation to combat transnational challenges, such as cross-border crimes, terrorism, the illegal drug trade and piracy.

The two sides agreed to enhance consultation on policy planning, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America within the Strategic Dialogue framework, with a view to broadening and deepening cooperation on issues of mutual concern.

V. On Mechanism for China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue

The two sides expressed their shared view that the SED will continue to advance China-US relations in tandem with other existing bilateral mechanisms. The Dialogue represents a major initiative to further develop China-US relations in the new era, and offers an important platform for the two countries to deepen understanding, enhance mutual trust, and promote cooperation. In order to more fully explore shared solutions on a wide range of common challenges, the Chinese and US delegations look forward to further discussions on specific matters raised at the dialogues through special representatives of the two presidents, working groups, and existing bilateral dialogues.

#### OUR IMPACT IS THE BIGGEST – EVERY IMPACT SCENARIO CAN BE SOLVED BY SINO-US RELATIONS

Beijing Xinhua 09

[Beijing Xinhua in English China's official news service for English-language audiences (New China News Agency)] Xinhua 'Commentary': World Has Every Reason To Closely Watch Obama's China Visit 11/17/09 Westlaw]

As American geostrategist Zbigniew Brzezinski said at a January seminar marking the 30th anniversary of the two countries' diplomatic ties, China and the United States have become important forces in global political and economic stability.

Since the ice-breaking visit by late U.S. President Richard Nixon to China in 1972 against the backdrop of the Cold War, bilateral cooperation has expanded to the areas of politics, economy, military and culture.

BOTh countries are aware of the importance of their relations.

Though Obama won the presidential election under the banner of "Change," he decided to keep the U.S.' China policy of communications and cooperation unchanged, according to Harry Harding, a leading China specialist in the United States who has advised several presidents.

President Hu Jintao also stressed more than once that healthy development of Sino-U.S. relations is not only in the fundamental interests of both countries, but is also conducive to peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.

Given the interwoven relations that China and the United States share in a global village, both nations see huge potential in seeking their common interests through expanded cooperation.

And major challenges, such as the global economic downturn, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and climate change, cannot be tackled by a single country on its own. Instead, they need the joint efforts of the international community, where the United States and China, as two influential countries, should play exemplary roles.

Obama's visit to China offered an opportunity for China and the United States to reach understandings and agreements and seek solutions to a variety of global issues.

China served as an important engine to drive forward global economic recovery while the United States saw its economy reverse the trend of recession in the third quarter of this year.

To reinforce the positive economic momentum and promote global development in a steady, orderly manner, the United States and China need to join hands in the spirit of mutual support.

Among all of the issues, global warming is a problem of immediate consequence. Earlier this month in Barcelona, representatives from more than 40 small-island countries warned during a five-day convention on climate change that any delay in a solution to the problem would increase the possibility of their homes being flooded.

As the world's two major greenhouse gas emitters, how the United States and China will cooperate and assume responsibility is a concern with global ramifications.

Undoubtedly, China and the United States still, and will always, have disagreements, especially in the fields of trade, currencies, greenhouse gas emissions, and political and military trust.

But disagreements provide room for talks, improved communications and enhanced cooperation.

## 3

#### INTERP - PREDICTIONS MUST HAVE A CLAIM, A WARRANT, AND STRONG DATA TO GET A DEFAULT 100% PROBABILITY, ANYTHING LESS GETS 0%.

#### STRONG DATA REQUIRES (1) EXPLICIT DISCLOSURE OF (2) QUANTIFIABLE RESEARCH METHODS

THEY DON'T MEET – THEY ARE WEAK DATA

**Rosekind 09**

**[Mark R. Rosekind, Ph.D Kevin B. Gregory Alertness Solutions The Moebus Aviation Report on "Scientific and Medical Evaluationof Flight Time Limitations": Invalid, Insufficient, and Risky Alertness SolutionsJanuary 2009]**

While the extensive scientific literature on fatigue has definitively established its role in reducing alertness, performance, and safety, there remains a significant and critical gap in the scientific data available to address policy issues and provide specific solutions. There are few studies that have specifically tested an alertness strategy/fatigue countermeasure or compared an established regulatory policy to an alternative or quantified the benefits of implementing an Alertness Management Program (AMP)/Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS). Regulatory authorities continually confront this gap between the science establishing fatigue as a significant safety issue and having data to address policy issues or provide specific solutions in their efforts to address fatigue risks through policymaking. EASA's request for scientific and medical evaluation of 18 specific flight time limitation questions is one more example of such an effort. However, the resulting MAR addressing the 18 posed questions is invalid, insufficient, and risky. The following highlights some of the most significant and relevant issues in each of these areas.

I. Invalid

a. No data. In 13 of the 18 questions posed there is direct acknowledgement that no data is available to address the question or the data that are cited do not specifically address the question posed. Therefore, 73% of the questions do not have any data or relevant,appropriate data to provide an evaluation of the issue identified (e.g., #1, 6, 10, 13).

b. Recommendations without data . Though acknowledging no data or no relevant data are available, specific recommendations are still made to address the questions posed. The primary task identified was to provide a scientific and medical evaluation of the questions posed, however, the MAR goes beyond this tasking to provide specific recommendations intended for policy making .These recommendations were not data-driven and relied on generalizing from other information to fill the "data gap" . However, the recommendations are presented in a manner to suggest that they could be used for data based policies.

c. Subjective data sources . A significant number of the scientific citations used to substantiate specific points were studies that utilized only subjective , self-reporting measures. Subjective, self-report measures can be discrepant from objective measures of alertness and performance, biased, and influenced by varied sources. It is critical that scientific data used as a basis for policy making be based on objective , measurable outcomes related to performance, relevant operational variables, behavioral actions,errors, incidents, accidents and appropriate safety measures. Subjective measures can complement these other varied objective outcomes but are highly questionable as the exclusive source for an evaluation or recommendation. For example, the MAR cites previous NASA research related to a subjective survey on sleep quantity and quality in onboard crew rest/bunk facilities (1). Yet the MAR does not include a complementary NASA study that included objective physiological measures of sleep quantity and quality in onboard rest facilities during actual operations involving two different flight patterns and three different aircraft (2).

d. Ignores operational experience and safety history. While a scientific and medical evaluation of the 18 questions posed is relevant, equally relevant is the operational experience and safety history of the activities being addressed. Policy making to address established safety issues could consider safety data, operational experience, relevant scientific findings, and where appropriate, economic factors. When the MAR goes beyond scientific and medical evaluation to make "practical" recommendations, it enters a realm where these other relevant factors (safety data, operational experience, 'economics, etc.) become significant considerations.

e. No quantification of risk/benefit . In policy-making efforts, it is critical to go beyond documentation of an effect to quantifying specifics of the risk . Regarding fatigue, this translates into both quantifying the risk and identifying the specific areas where these risks are expressed. First, this allows decisions about what specific fatigue-related risks to address and their priorities . Second, it provides a basis for determining expected,quantifiable benefits and outcomes that could be measured by implementing policies and activities . The MAR expert panel made an effort to use this approach in a couple of its responses (e.g., #2, 12). However, the quantification of risks and subsequent, quantifiable benefits of implementing policies and recommendations should be the lead issue in addressing all of the questions posed .

#### THE REASON TO PREFER IS EDUCATION – STRONG DATA IS KEY TO GOOD POLICYMAKING

Saks 86

[Michael J. Prof of Law at Arizona State University, cited in a Supreme Court opinion and thousands of articles. B.A., B.S., Pennsylvania State University, 1969; M.A., 1972; Ph.D., Ohio State University, 1975; M.S.L., Yale Law School, 1983. \*63 IF THERE BE A CRISIS, HOW SHALL WE KNOW IT? 46 Md. L. Rev. 63 Fall, 1986]

I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE PROBLEM AND ITS CAUSES

One of the most important aspects of this as well as related earlier articles by Professor Galanter [FN2] and his colleagues [FN3] is that they inquire into the degree to which relevant empirical evidence supports the claims made concerning a litigation explosion, and they share with us the findings of that inquiry. The explosion appears to be more rhetorical than real.

Those offering wholesale condemnation of our civil justice system, and counseling a variety of reforms ranging from tinkering to \*64 radical alteration, are confident they know a serious problem exists and, what is more, they know its causes . [FN4] Their language is so strong and so clear that one hesitates to doubt the accuracy of their vision. But in support of their views, they generally offer little more than unsupported assertions or anecdotes , examples of which Professor Galanter has cited. Mere assertion is simply that, and repeating something often or enlarging the chorus does not make it any more true.

As I have noted elsewhere, [FN5] government by anecdote is a bad idea not because the anecdotes are untrue or are not evidence (though sometimes they are untrue and therefore are not evidence), [FN6] but because they contribute so little to developing a clear picture of the situation we are concerned about. It makes a difference if for every ten anecdotes in which an undeserving plaintiff bankrupts an innocent defendant, zero, ten, one hundred, one thousand, or ten thousand equal and opposite injustices were done to deserving and innocent plaintiffs . [FN7] The proportion of cases that results in some sort of error , [FN8] and the ratio of one kind of error to the other, ought to be of greater interest to a serious policy-maker than a handful of anecdotes on either side of an issue. After all, the reforms to be adopted are intended to change that ratio and the tens of thousands of anecdotes it summarizes.

This brings us, then, to the kind of information that should form the core of the debate: data . If the explosion is real and the \*65 crisis serious, it should not be difficult to find data confirming those fears. In this regard, Professor Galanter makes two important contributions to the liability crisis debate. He summarizes some important data, and he helps us to think about what they mean. Conscientious policy-makers will be interested to learn that 98% of civil litigation goes on in state courts, that those filings have declined in the past several years, and that even tort filings have increased only 1 % more than population growth. [FN9] Those urging reform, when they do point to data, usually point to the 2% of litigation that is handled by federal courts. Professor Galanter helps us to interpret the meaning of those federal data, [FN10] which show a 123% increase in filings over the past decade.

First of all, he notes that an increase in filings is not necessarily a reflection of an increase in plaintiffs' “litigiousness.” Changes in filing rates are equally a reflection of defendants' resistance to resolving disputes short of litigation. The filing rate reflects, as well, the volume of transactions, the number of actionable injuries resulting from those transactions, lawyers' case-screening practices, and, no doubt, numerous othervariables. [FN 1 1] Any real understanding of what is going on requires knowing what lies behind and gives rise to any change (or stability) in filing rates.

Moreover, Professor Galanter shows us that the 123% increase \*66 means something other than appears at first blush. By disaggregating those cases into the categories supplied by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Professor Galanter finds that it is the federal government itself that has added by far the largest fraction of the increase in litigation, having increased its filings (of over-payment recoveries) by 6,683%! [FN12] Except for products liability (of which one-fourth were asbestos claims, now waning), the federal caseload for tort cases has been fairly stable.

These are but a few illustrations of the way Professor Galanter, and other empirically oriented legal scholars, force us to deal with the evidence of the world we propose to reshape through law reform. We need not limit policy debates to a mutually uninformative swapping of anecdotes or a heated exchange of quotations. In my view, it is enormously helpful to inform ourselves about our world empirically , and to think intelligently about the alternative interpretations of the relevant empirical data. [FN13]

That the topographic map of vociferous reformers is not consistent with the most fundamental features of the landscape over which they presume to reign should give us all pause. If their assessment of our condition — the easiest part of problem-solving — can be so inconsistent with the evidence, we might well be hesitant to accept their diagnosis of causes and their prescribed treatment.

**ITS A VOTER FOR PRECEDENT**

Sterba 06

[Sonya K. Department of Psychology University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Misconduct in the Analysis and Reporting of Data: Bridging Methodological and Ethical Agendas for Change ETHICS & BEHAVIOR, 16(4), 305–318 2006]

In conclusion, ethical and methodological specialists ’ gatekeeping efforts in the area of data analysis and reporting have remained strikingly disparate and insular to date. They neither coordinate with each other nor involve the research community in outreach efforts aimed at engendering self-monitoring. Their independent efforts have led to insufficient examination of the prevalence of overt and covert misconduct, and to inconsistent standards that are unreliably enforced. Yet the quality control of data analyses and reporting practices is of prime importance . Thus, I propose three tactics to improve the prevention, detection, and deterrence of analysis and reporting misconduct that each involve melding of the methodological and ethical arenas. First, psychologists need to better coordinate ethical and methodological standards pertaining to data analysis and reporting. Published methodological standards can lack the ethical imperative to motivate change, and published ethical standards can lack the specificity to direct that change. One first step toward coordinating standard setting across ethical and methodological specialties is offered here. Methodologists could be included on the committees of psychologists who create and revise research ethics codes and who respond to allegations of research ethics misconduct. In turn, committees disseminating methodological guidance, such as the APA Task Force on Statistical Inference, could include psychologists with research ethics expertise to aid in integrating an ethical perspective. Second, we need to increase applied researchers’ access to coordinated training in quantitative methods and research ethics. This will afford them the detailed methodological knowledge and the ethical imperative to better selfmonitor their own analysis and reporting. Specifically, a cross-fertilization of ethics and methods instruction needs to take place throughout undergraduate and graduate training , and also at the faculty level. Currently, statistical and methodological courses are typically devoid of research ethics discussions, and vice versa. In fact, these ethics courses and methods courses are typically offered in different departments, by faculty members who rarely interact. Faculty guest lectures from the companion discipline can begin to bridge these fields. In addition, short quantitative workshops (such as those offered by the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research) and ethics workshops (such as those sponsored by the APA Ethics Committee) are outlets for reaching researchers who may not have access to methodological or ethical specialists at their home institutions. (Neither the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research nor the Ethics Committee currently lists ethics in data analysis and reporting as a topic area covered in their educational outreach efforts.) It is essential that undergraduate and graduate psychology students be made mindful of the intersection of their methodological practices with ethical imperatives as they begin to conduct their own investigations—before poor habits become ingrained. We cannot expect students to completely autonomously make the connections between ethical and methodological imperatives; we need to scaffold them in this endeavor. This type of blended educational effort would increase the pool of journal and grant reviewers qualified to detect and enforce standards for analysis and reporting conduct. This, in turn, would render the field ’ s examination of data analysis and reporting practices more pervasive and more reliable . Third, psychologists need to more consistently implement strategies for preventing and deterring data analysis and reporting misconduct. Random auditing of analyses in articles submitted for peer review, and perhaps also systematic surveying of peer reviews themselves, are potential preventative deterrents (Kimmel, 1996). These deterrents would essentially be an expansion of the Code’s mandate to keep data available for potential reanalysis. If an audit of a given analysis reveals errors or discrepancies, the response would not be to try to determine whether this error was intentional or accidental. Instead, journal editors and reviewers would take it as their responsibility to inform authors of the ethical or methodological standards that were violated and issue a penalty—such as a request for reanalysis or replication—regardless of intent. This removes some of the professional hesitancy, fear of reprisals, and time involved in trying to prove intentional misconduct. This suggestion is in line with Snow’s (1959) argument that “if we do not penalize false statements made in error, we open up the way, don ’ t you see, for false statements by intention ” (quoted in Kimmel, 1996, p. 273).

**AND VOTE NEG ON PRESUMPTION – THE AFFS HARMS AND SOLVENCY HAVE ZERO PROBABILITY BECAUSE THEY ARE WITHIN THE STATISTICAL MARGIN FOR ERROR**

Zellner 07

[Arnold Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago Philosophy and objectives of econometrics Journal of Econometrics Volume 136, Issue 2, February 2007, Pages 331-339]

On the relation of science and econometrics, I have for long emphasized the unity of science principle, which Karl Pearson put forward as follows: the unity of science is a unity of methods employed in analyzing and learning from experience and data. The subject matter discipline may be economics, history, physics, or the like, but the methods employed in analyzing and learning from data are basically the same. As (Jeffreys, 1957) and (Jeffreys, 1967) expresses the idea, “There must be a uniform standard of validity for all hypotheses, irrespective of the subject . Different laws may hold in different subjects, but they must be tested by the same criteria ; otherwise we have no guarantee that our decisions will be those warranted by the data and not merely of inadequate analysis or of believing what we want to believe . ” Thus the unity of science principle sets the same standards for work in the natural and social sciences. For example, this range of considerations is particularly relevant for those in economics who cross-correlate variables and assert causation on the basis of such correlations alone (See Zellner (1979a) for consideration of such tests and of alternative definitions of causality) or those who carelessly test all hypotheses in the “5% accept–reject syndrome.” Also, we must emphasize the importance of a general unified set of methods for use in science and the undesirability of unnecessary jargon and ad hoc methods.

Given that we take the unity of science principle seriously, we may next ask what are the main objectives of science. As Karl Pearson, Harold Jeffreys, and others state, one of the main objectives of science , and I add of econometrics, is that of learning from our experience and data. Knowledge so obtained may be sought for its own sake, for example, to satisfy our curiosity about economic phenomena and/or for practical policy and other decision purposes. One part of our knowledge is merely description of what we have observed; the more important part is generalization or induction, that is that part which “... consists of making inferences from past experience to predict future [or as yet unobserved] experience,” as Jeffreys puts it.

Thus there are at least two components to our knowledge, description and generalization or induction. While generalization or induction is usually considered to be more important, description plays a significant role in science, including economics. For example, Burns and Mitchell's monumental NBER study Measuring Business Cycles is mainly descriptive but valuable in providing general features of business cycles about which others can generalize . While some have damned this work as “measurement without theory ,” the opposite sin of “ theory without measurement” seems much more serious. In fact there are too many mathematical economic theories which explain no past data and which are incapable of making predictions about future or as yet unobserved experience. Such economic theories are mathematical denk-spielen and not inductive generalizations to which I referred above. Further, I shall later mention another important role for description in connection with reductive inference.

In learning from our experience and data, it is critical that we understand the roles and nature of three kinds of inference, namely, deductive inference, inductive inference, and reductive inference.

As regards deductive inference, Reichenbach (1958) explains, “Logical proof is called deduction; the conclusion is obtained by deducing it from other statements, called the premises of the argument. The argument is so constructed that if the premises are true the conclusions must also be true. ... It unwraps, so to speak, the conclusion that was wrapped up in the premises.” Clearly, much economic theory is an exercise in deductive inference. However, the inadequacies of deductive inference for scientific work must be noted. First, traditional deductive inference leads just to the extreme attitudes of proof, disproof, or ignorance with respect to propositions. There is no provision for a statement like “A proposition is probably true” in deductive inference or logic. This is a deficiency of deduction for scientific work wherein such statements are very widely employed and found to be useful. Second, deduction or deductive inference alone provides no guide for choice among logically correct alternative explanations or theories. As is well known, for any given set of data, there is an infinity of models which fit the data exactly. Deduction provides no guide for selection among this infinity of models.

Thus, there is a need for a type of inference which is broader than deductive inference and which yields statements less extreme than deductive inference . This type of inference is called inductive inference by Jeffreys. It enables us to associate probabilities with propositions and to manipulate them in a consistent, logical way to take account of new information. Deductive statements of proof and disproof are then viewed as limiting cases of inductive logic wherein probabilities approach one or zero, respectively.

Jeffreys (1967), who has made major contributions to the development of inductive logic in his book Theory of Probability states that inductive inference involves “ making inferences from past experience to predict future experience ” by use of inductive generalizations or laws . And given actual outcomes, the procedures of inductive inference allow us to revise probabilities associated with inductive generalizations or laws to reflect the information contained in new data .

Note that for Jeffreys induction is not an economical description of past data, as Mach suggested since Mach omitted the all-important predictive aspect of induction. Further, predictive inductive inferences have an unavoidable uncertainty associated with them, as Hume pointed out many years ago. For example, it is impossible to prove, deductively or inductively that generalizations or laws, even the Chicago quantity theory of money , are absolutely true . Even Newton's laws, which were considered “ absolutely true ” by many physicists in the nineteenth century, have been replaced by Einstein's laws. Thus there is an unavoidable uncertainty associated with laws in all areas of science, including economics. Inductive logic provides a quantification of this uncertainty by associating probabilities with laws and providing logically consistent procedures for changing these probabilities as new evidence arises . In this regard, probability is viewed as representing a degree of reasonable belief with the limiting values of zero being complete disbelief or disproof and of one being complete belief of proof.

For Jeffreys, Bayesian statistics is implied by his theory of scientific method. Thus, Bayesian statistics is the technology of inductive inference. The operations of Bayesian statistics enable us to make probability statements about parameters ’ values and future values of variables . Also, optimal point estimates and point predictions can be readily obtained by Bayesian methods. Probabilities and/or odds ratios relating to competing hypotheses or models can be evaluated which reflect initial information and sample information. Thus, many inference problems encountered in induction can be solved by Bayesian methods and these solutions are compatible with Jeffreys's theory of scientific method. See, e.g., Berry et al. (1996), Box and Tiao (1973), DeGroot (1970), Fienberg and Zellner (1975) and (Zellner, 1971) and (Zellner, 1979b) for presentations, discussions and applications of Bayesian methods.

To illustrate inductive inference in econometrics, consider Milton Friedman's Theory of the Consumption Function . In his book Friedman set forth a bold inductive generalization which, he showed, explained variation in much past data, a fact that increased most individuals ’ degree of reasonable belief in his theory. Further, Friedman proposed a number of additional tests of his model and predicted their outcomes, an example of what we referred to above as inductive inference . Many of these tests have been performed with results compatible with Friedman's predictions. Such results enhance the degree of reasonable belief that we have in Friedman's theory. This is the kind of research in economics and econometrics , which illustrates well the nature of inductive inference and is, in my opinion, most productive .

As regards inductive generalizations, there are a few points, which deserve to be emphasized. First, a useful starting point for inductive generalization in many instances is the proposition that all variation is considered random or nonsystematic unless shown otherwise . A good example of the fruitfulness of such a starting point is given by the random walk hypothesis for stock prices in stock market research. Many researchers have put forward models to forecast stock prices by use of variables such as auto sales, changes in money, and the like only to find that their forecasts are no better than those yielded by a random walk model. In other areas, when a researcher proposes a new effect, the burden is on him to show that data support the new effect . The initial hypothesis is thus, “ No effect unless shown otherwise . ”

#### They essentialize capitalism as an ideology – which dooms alt solvency and creates a self-fulfilling prophecy by denying the very material reform of the plan.

Cleaver 00

[Harry, Professor of Economics @ Utexas. Ph.D. Stanford University 1975 (Economics). Reading Capital Politically] [ct] [http://www.eco.utexas.edu/~hmcleave/rcp1.html]

What we have here is a reading of Capital that is not only limited to being a passive interpretation, but which also, by restricting itself to the "economic" sphere or "base" effectively, makes of political economy the theory of the capitalist factory and its waged workers alone. (49) This has the effect of excluding the rest of society from the analysis -- not only the state and party politics but also the unemployed, the family, the school, health care, the media, art, and so on. As a result political economists who would try to take these things into account find themselves rummaging through Marx's writings looking for suggestive tidbits of "other" theories. (50) Yet it is precisely in these "other" social spheres that many of the major social conflicts of today are occurring. At the turn of the century, when working-class struggle was located primarily (but not uniquely by any means) in the factory, there was perhaps some excuse for reading Capital as a theoretical model of the capitalist factory. But as a result of the extensive social engineering of the 1920s and 1930s through which capitalist social planners sought to restructure virtually all of society, and as a result of the nature of recent social struggles against such planning, such interpretations today are grossly inadequate. The New Left correctly sensed this and avoided orthodox interpretations. The inadequacy of both orthodox and neo-Marxist theories became abundantly clear in the late 1960s. Both were unequipped to explain the revolts of the unwaged and were forced to appeal to ad hoc solutions. Orthodoxy revived historical materialism and tried to shove peasant revolts into the box of pre-capitalist modes of production. Student revolts were classified as either petty bourgeois or lumpen. Women's revolts were within the framework of some "domestic" mode of production. All were thus set aside as unimportant secondary phenomena because they were not truly working class. This of course set up the Party once again as the mediating interpreter of the real working-class interests and justified the attempt to repress or co-opt these struggles.

Although the neo-Marxism of the New Left made these struggles central to its notion of revolution, it fared little better theoretically. Because it accepted orthodoxy's exclusion of these groups from the working class, all it could offer were vague evocations of "the people's" interests. In as much as either they fell outside the "economic" sphere or their place within it was obscure, these revolts had to be seen as byproducts of the general irrationality of the system. We can thus see that one great weakness of reading Marx as political economy has been to isolate and reduce his analysis to that of the factory. But if this is a weakness which has made both orthodox and neo-Marxism utterly incapable of accounting for the present crisis, it is not the only problem.

Even more important is the one-sidedness of all these analyses, from those of the Second International right up through the contemporary debates on crisis theory. This one-sidedness lies in the limited way in which the working class, however defined, makes an appearance in these models. When it appears on the scene at all, it comes in from the outside and usually as a victim fighting defensive battles. This is why I would label the Marxist or neo-Marxist categories employed in these models "reified." They are "reified" in that instead of being understood as designating social relations between the classes they have been turned into designations of things, things within capital separate from the social relation. In fact the concept of capital itself in these models usually designates not the class relation (that is sometimes thrown in as an afterthought) but rather the means of production, money capital, commodity capital, and labor power, all circulating as mindless entities through the ups and downs of their circuits. Where does the impulse to movement, technological change, or expansion come from in these models? Why, it comes from within capital, of course, usually the blind result of competition among capitalists. When competition breaks down in monopoly capital, Marxists like Baran, Sweezy, and Josef Steindl deduce a necessary tendency to stagnation. In either case the working class is only a spectator to the global waltz of capital's autonomous self-activating development.

This was not Marx's view of the world. Not only did he repeatedly insist that capital was a social relation of classes, but he also explicitly stated that at the level of the class the so-called economic relations were in fact political relations:

Every movement in which the working class comes out as a class against the ruling classes and attempts to force them by pressure from without is a political movement. For instance, the attempt in a particular factory or even a particular industry to force a shorter working day out of the capitalists by strikes, etc., is a purely economic movement. On the other hand the movement to force an eight hour day, etc., law is a political movement. And in this way, out of the separate economic movements of the workers there grows up everywhere a political movement, that is to say a movement of the class, with the object of achieving its interests in a general form, in a form possessing a general social force of compulsion. (51)

The point here is that as the struggle for the eight-hour day develops, as it becomes generalized, it moves beyond the particular demands of a narrowly defined group of workers and becomes a demand of the whole class and thus political. This corresponds to a historical movement which begins with the demands of a quantitatively small number of workers but which circulates to become a new qualitative focal point of the class struggle. Such demands spread if they correspond to the underlying social conditions of the class generally. Marx sought out and analyzed several of these struggles -- over the length of the working day, the intensity of work, productivity, mechanization, the social wage, and so on. In Capital he lays out both the specific history of their development in England and their general place within capital, that is, within the overall class struggle. From the time when these areas of contention become generalized, they are branded as class and hence political relations. At any given moment particular groups of workers may or may not be actively struggling for one or another demand, but if they do, the individual struggle at each factory or industry can no longer be considered an isolated "purely economic" struggle but must be grasped as a part of the whole, as a political struggle for power. Today we can see this even more clearly than in Marx's time because of the transformed role of the state. The rise of the Keynesian state has meant the virtual merging of not only the state and the "economy" but of the state and "society" itself.

This is a second fundamental danger of reading Marx as political economy and as ideology. We are presented with elaborately detailed critical interpretations of this self-activating monster in a way that completely ignores the way actual working-class power forces and checks capitalist development. Marx saw how the successful struggle for a shorter working day caused a crisis for capital. These political economists do not: they see absolute surplus value as a reified abstract concept. Marx saw how that struggle forced the development of productivity-raising innovations which raised the organic composition of capital. He thus saw relative surplus value as a strategic capitalist response. These political economists do not: they see only competition between capitalists. Marx saw how workers' wage struggles could help precipitate capitalist crises. These political economists see only abstract "laws of motion." (52) These kinds of interpretations glorify the dynamic of capital, however evil, and portray the working class as a hapless victim. Because of this, even if one wishes to see ideological critique as a weapon in the class struggle, one must conclude that such theories which accord all power to capital can only be in its interest. Such critiques are particularly well suited to the needs of Leninist parties or any other elitist groups which would present themselves as the only solution for the class. If the class is powerless in the "economic" struggle, as the theories say, then its only solution is obviously "to join the Party and smash the state." How this mass of hapless victims is to achieve such a feat would seem to be a mystery understood only by the Party hierarchy, who will provide the necessary leadership and wisdom. But the truth is that the class is not powerless at all and that the Party leaders seek to mobilize its power as a prelude to taking control themselves and becoming the managers of a rationalized, planned "socialist" economy in which the workers, they hope, will work even harder than before.

CARD CONTINUES

The flaw that lies at the very heart of Critical Theory's concept of bourgeois cultural hegemony (just as it lurks within political economy's theory of capitalist technological domination in the factory) is its total one-sidedness. The positing of cultural hegemony, like that of an all-powerful technological rationality, reflects the inability to recognize or theorize the growth of any working-class power capable of threatening the system. Although the theory may have accurately reflected the new issues that accompanied the rise of Hitler, Stalin, and Roosevelt, its exaggerated pessimism became manifested in the 1960s. The logic of the theory of absolute consumerist integration forced Marcuse, Baran, and Sweezy to interpret the upheavals of the time as falling "outside" the class struggle and they built their hopes on what they saw as revolts against racial and sexual repression and against the general irrationality of the system. This exteriorization of contradiction blinded them all to the effectiveness of the actual struggles of wage workers as well as their interaction with the complementary struggles of the unwaged. As a result Marcuse could see only defeat in the dissolution of the "movement" in the early 1970s and the rising danger of a new fascism. Unable to grasp how the cycle of struggles of the 1960s had thrown capital into crisis, was forced back to the political economy of Baran and Sweezy for an explanation of the international economic crisis of the 1970s. (82) It is ironic that, while he has spoken of a capitalist "counterrevolution" that could lead to 1984, he cannot see the "revolution" to which it is a counter and can only proclaim it a "preventive" action by capital. (83) He does see the revolt against work but interprets its rampant absenteeism, falling productivity, industrial sabotage, wildcat strikes, and school dropouts as simply "prepolitical" signs of discontent and of the possible crumbling of bourgeois cultural hegemony via managed consumerism. (84) As a result he has begun, in Counterrevolution and Revolt (1972), to remodel his critical theory into one of how the consumerist logic of contemporary capitalism may be undermining itself by the production of nonintegrable, transcendent needs. He postulates a growing divergence between the consumerist promises of capitalist ideology propagated by the mass media and the willingness to deliver in a period of economic crisis: "a contradiction between that which is and that which is possible and ought to be." (85) The political conclusions Marcuse draws from this analysis formulate the current political situation in terms of the ideological question of whether growing popular dissatisfaction can be crafted by a revitalized New Left educational and organizational effort into a real threat to the system. Despite his affirmation that consumerism has enlarged the base of exploitation and political revolt, and his calls for a New Left revival, it must be said that he repeatedly points to what sometimes seems to be insurmountable difficulties in carrying out this program. Given his insistence on the isolation of radicals, his repeated affirmation of the "political weakness and the non-revolutionary attitude of the majority of the working class," and his endorsement of the necessity of a "long march through the institutions" (working within the system), one is not surprised to find in his final declaration the traditional Old Left evocation of the "long road": "the next revolution will be the concern of generations and the 'final crisis of capitalism' may take all but a century." (86) Gone is his sense of optimism that rode the wave of struggles of the 1960s. Marcuse seems to have rediscovered the inherent pessimism of the Frankfurt School's concept of hegemony as well as its limited political program for a long process of "building consciousness" through the ideological critique of society. Blind to the real power developed and held by workers today, Marcuse cannot see either the extent and difficulties of current capitalist attempts at restructuring or how the continuing struggles of workers are thwarting those efforts. Of this drama he can capture only the repressive side of the capitalist offensive and falls back into a more or less traditional leftist program of defense against authoritarian state capitalism via the ideological struggles of Critical Theory.

To summarize: despite the originality and usefulness of their research into the mechanisms of capitalist domination in both the economic and cultural spheres, and indeed precisely in the formulation of those mechanisms as one-sidedly hegemonic, Critical Theorists have remained blind to the ability of working-class struggles to transform and threaten the very existence of capital. Their concept of domination is so complete that the "dominated" virtually disappears as an active historical subject. In consequence, these philosophers have failed to escape the framework of mere ideological critique of capitalist society.

To return to the military analogy used earlier in this introduction, we can pose the difficulty this way: if one's attention is focused uniquely on the enemy's activities on the battlefield, the battle will assuredly be lost. In the class war, as in conventional military encounters, one must begin with the closest study of one's own forces, that is, the structure of working-class power. Without an understanding of one's own power, the ebb and flow of the battle lines can appear as an endless process driven only by the enemy's unilateral self-activity. When the enemy regroups or restructures, as capital is doing in the present crisis, its actions must be grasped in terms of the defeat of prior tactics or strategies by our forces -- not simply as another clever move. That an analysis of enemy strategy is necessary is obvious. The essential point is that an adequate understanding of that strategy can be obtained only by grasping it in relation to our own strengths and weaknesses.

In the movie Patton there is a highly instructive scene in which Patton sees that he will defeat Rommel's armor in North Africa and cries, "Rommel, you magnificent bastard, I read your book!" He is referring to a translation of Rommel's book on tank warfare. If Patton had read that book of his declared opponent the way Critical Theorists read bourgeois authors, he would still have been sitting in his quarters writing "critiques" of this point or that when Rommel rolled over him with his army. Instead, he read the book as an enemy weapon, which it was, in order to develop better strategies to defeat him. It would also have done him little good if, when he finally faced Rommel's army, he had had no understanding of the strengths of his own firepower. (87)

It serves little purpose to study the structures of capitalist domination unless they are recognized as strategies that capital must struggle to impose. Revolutionary strategy cannot be created from an ideological critique; it develops within the actual ongoing growth of working-class struggle. Blindness to this inevitably forces one back into the realm of "consciousness raising" as the only way to bridge the perceived gap between working-class powerlessness (capitalist hegemony) and working-class victory (revolutionary defeat of capital).